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Introduction 
The publication of the annual Government Expenditure and 
Revenues in Scotland (GERS) Report by the Scottish 
Executive is a continuing source of political dispute.  This 
set piece confrontation, however, seldom generates any 
realistic assessment of its merits, because it results in claim 
and counter-claim over its validity in colourful language.  It is 
not the “bogus” statistical exercise its critics suggest, 
although not without problems of interpretation.
1
 
 
In the 2006 Report, the conclusion that the fiscal deficit had 
grown from £5.3 billions to £11.2 billions over five years, led 
one critic to describe it as “economic mismanagement of 
truly Zimbabwean proportions” by the Scottish Executive.
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However, as the editor of this journal has succinctly stated – 
“regional budget deficits do not matter, there is no 
requirement to account for them and regional policy-makers 
do not need to seek directly to manage them”.
3
 
 
 
 
Scotland’s fiscal deficit is not akin to those of sovereign 
states, but simply a measure of the fiscal balance between 
expenditure and revenues within the United Kingdom.  That 
is, the Scottish fiscal deficit arises from the difference 
between the revenues raised and public money spent in 
Scotland as a part of the United Kingdom, as a reflection of 
UK fiscal and budgetary policy.  Ashcroft rightly argues it 
would be more accurately described as a fiscal transfer, 
which reflects the pooling of resources within the UK. The 
question is, why has it grown so significantly in the post- 
devolution period? 
 
GERS 2006 
The 2006 Report was examined by the Parliament’s 
Finance Committee earlier this year, and this paper draws 
on both my research paper prepared for the Committee, and 
the evidence provided to it by a number of leading Scottish 
economists. 
 
GERS was first published in 1992, and sought to bring 
together, in convenient reference form, available facts and 
figures about government expenditure and revenues in 
Scotland.
4  
It has since become “an important element in the 
debate about the size of Scotland’s budget deficit or fiscal 
deficit and the implications for Scottish living standards 
under constitutional options open to the people of 
Scotland”.
5
 
 
This is because it is regarded by the Executive economists 
who produce it as providing a description of “the flows that 
would be inherited by a new administration, whatever the 
constitutional arrangements at that time”.
6  
It is the 
consistent conclusion of the GERS Report, over the fifteen 
year period since it was first published, that Scotland has a 
significant fiscal deficit that is the focus of the political 
dispute.  But whilst there is disagreement between parties 
over this conclusion, the research literature contains a 
number of published papers which have accepted that 
GERS provides a broad, but realistic, assessment of 
Scotland’s fiscal position within the UK, whilst querying 
specific aspects of the methodology.
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The terminology of GERS, however, in describing the 
excess of expenditure over revenue as a General 
Government Borrowing Requirement (GGBR), is misleading 
and inappropriate.  Scotland is part of the United Kingdom, 
and only the UK fiscal deficit has to be met by government 
borrowing.  Scotland’s fiscal balance, like all other nations 
and regions of the UK, is met automatically by the operation 
of the uniform system of taxation and government borrowing 
where necessary.  The British approach has no direct 
territorial link between tax and spending. 
 
The pattern of fiscal flows result in fiscal transfers, through a 
process of equalisation.  Areas can be equalised for 
expenditure needs and/or tax capacity.  In Britain, 
equalisation for tax capacity only operates in local 
government, through grant to ensure authorities have the 
resources to meet their expenditure needs assessment. 
The financial arrangements for devolution reflect the 
expenditure basis of the UK system, which recognises the 
economic unity of the UK by considering allocations 
together, so Scotland benefits from higher spending on 
public services, reflective of higher expenditure need, and 
regional policy allocations intended to reduce inequalities in 
economic performance.
9  
GERS records the outcome of the 
pattern of fiscal flows by providing estimates of expenditure 
and revenue, and an overall summary of the net fiscal 
balance.  Estimates reflect plausible assumptions, and are 
necessary in the absence of regional budgetary accounts. 
 
Scotland’s relatively high levels of public expenditure have a 
long history, traceable back to 1928, and continuing 
consistently from then.
10   
Post-devolution, questions as to 
whether Scotland’s expenditure needs still justify such 
differentials are increasingly asked by researchers, in the 
light of the relative improvement of the Scottish economy in 
terms of incomes and employment.
11
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The growth of the fiscal deficit 
If Scotland’s economy has been improving, why has the 
fiscal deficit grown? This growth dates from 1999 – the first 
year of devolution – but in practice is a direct result of the 
fiscal and budgetary policy of the UK government, which 
embarked on a wholly exceptional period of spending 
growth.  Spending has grown twice as fast as revenues 
since then.  Aggregate spending in Scotland grew by 41%, 
from £33.8 billions in 1999-2000 to £47.7 billions in 2004-5; 
revenues only grew by 22%, from £29.8 billions to £36.4 
billions over the same period.  Whilst this is not a 
sustainable approach in the long term, there is evidence that 
this spending contributed positively to economic growth over 
this period.
12
 
 
Table 1 below shows the growth in Scotland’s fiscal deficit, 
and the trend from surplus to deficit in the UK budget. The 
existence of a structural deficit is evidenced by the Scottish 
figure being in deficit throughout the whole period, whereas 
the UK was in surplus in 1999 and 2000, and had only a 
modest deficit in 2001. This is a cyclical deficit. That is, the 
UK’s move into deficit reflects a macroeconomic decision to 
increase government borrowing to maintain and enhance 
public spending at a rate faster than the growth of revenues 
from the economy. 
 
Table 1: The Growth of the Fiscal Deficit (£billions) 
 
 
 
Scotland UK 
1999 4.4 -13.1 
2000 5.3 -15.8 
2001 7.7 5.8 
2002 9.8 29.4 
2003 11.2 37.9 
2004 11.2 43.6 
 
 
Source: GERS 2005, 2006 
 
 
Table 2: Scottish Deficit including North Sea Revenues 
(£billions) 
 
 
 
£billion 
1999 1.9 
2000 1.1 
2001 2.8 
2002 4.4 
2003 6.9 
2004 6.0 
 
Source: GERS 2005, 2006 
 
 
 
The Scottish deficit should fall as UK government borrowing 
falls in subsequent years, but even when the UK is in 
balance, Scotland will still show a deficit, or more 
accurately, continue to benefit from a fiscal transfer.  As one 
recent study showed, only three of the twelve regions of the 
UK make positive contributions to the public finances – 
Greater London; Eastern England; and South-West 
England; whilst the other nine are all in receipt of fiscal 
transfers.
13
 
 
In the post-devolution period, total spending for Scotland 
grew much faster than revenues, from £30 billions in 1999 
to £47.6 billions in 2004 – an increase of 40%.  Revenues 
rose by only 15%, from £24.5 billions to £34 billions. 
 
Over this period, Scotland’s share of the UK budget 
remained broadly stable at around 9.9%, as did its revenue 
contributions at 8.2%. The GERS Report observes that the 
Scottish deficit has tended to mirror the changes that have 
taken place in the UK fiscal stance.  As Scotland receives 
around 9.9% of spending, it is reasonable to assume it 
accounts for 9.9% of borrowing, or £3.9 billions.  If this 
figure is subtracted from the net fiscal deficit of £11.2 
billions, it leaves a net fiscal transfer of £7.3 billions in 2004- 
5.
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The impact of oil and gas revenues 
One of the key issues in the political dispute is the omission 
of oil revenues from the calculation of the fiscal position.  Oil 
and gas revenues are treated as ex regio – not attributed to 
particular regions.  British governments have treated them 
as “windfall revenues” which are highly volatile and short 
term. This is an acceptable assumption if the purpose of the 
exercise is to monitor the pattern of fiscal flows within the 
United Kingdom under present accounting conventions. 
It is the inferences drawn from the recurring deficits for an 
independent Scotland that is the central political issue.  As 
with other revenues, it is impossible to make a precise 
assessment of the impact of such revenues on the fiscal 
position, so for illustrative purposes, this paper utilises the 
wholly unrealistic assumption that all such revenues would 
accrue to an independent Scotland. 
 
In the years in question, these have been broadly stable at 
around £4 billions, which would reduce but not eliminate 
the fiscal deficit Scotland would inherit from the UK. As 
Table 2 shows, the deficit would remain, and these revised 
figures understate the size of the deficit.  Whilst oil revenues 
have grown since then, an accurate picture of the impact of 
this trend awaits future GERS Reports, as spending has 
continued to grow in real terms since then. 
 
The GERS assessment is consistent with the judgements of 
independent researchers. Peter Wood, for example, 
concluded that: 
 
 
“A Scottish budget is in surplus only if almost all 
North Sea oil taxes are treated as Scottish, and 
only at times when oil prices are high.  Take away 
either of these conditions and the Scottish budget 
is in heavy deficit”.
15
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Similarly, the Constitution Unit concluded that: 
 
“Scotland has higher public spending and lower tax 
revenues per head than does the UK average, 
implying that when UK tax revenues and public 
expenditure are in balance, Scotland is in deficit. This 
excludes oil revenues which, when included, do not 
necessarily bring Scotland into balance. Relatively 
high oil prices and low US dollar values are required 
to bring present Scottish tax and 
spending patterns into balance”.
16
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the period since devolution, Scotland’s fiscal deficit has 
grown considerably, as a direct consequence of the fiscal 
and budgetary policies of the British Government. 
 
The growth of the deficit reflects the major increase in public 
spending financed in part by higher borrowing.  As the 
economic cycle turns, the deficit will begin to fall 
commensurately.  The underlying structural deficit reflects 
Scotland’s higher expenditure need and lower income 
levels.  This is not a fiscal issue within the United Kingdom, 
but would become a major budgetary issue to address under 
a model of fiscal autonomy, or independence. 
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